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SMITHIAN GROWTH THROUGH CREATIVE ORGANIZATION
Patrick Legros, Andrew F. Newman, and Eugenio Proto*
Abstract—We model technological progress as an external effect of orga-
nizational design, focusing on how factories, based on labor division,
could spawn the Industrial Revolution. Dividing labor, as Adam Smith
argued, facilitates invention by observers of production processes. How-
ever, entrepreneurs cannot internalize this benefit and choose labor division
to facilitate monitoring. Equilibrium with few entrepreneurs features low
wage shares, and high specialization, but a limited market for innovations.
Conversely, with many entrepreneurs, there is a large market for innovation
but little specialization because of high wage shares. Technological progress
therefore occurs with a moderate scarcity of entrepreneurs. Institutional
improvements affect growth ambiguously.
I. Introduction
LIKE other goods, ideas are best produced with the rightorganization. Since ideas drive technological change,
understanding economic growth means understanding the
relationship between organization and invention. What forms
of organization best foster the generation of new ideas? What
are the broader economic conditions in which such creative
organization will emerge?
Recent efforts to answer these questions have focused, nat-
urally enough, on the case in which invention happens to
be an objective of the firm, as in the R&D laboratory or
a new-product joint venture.1 In this situation, the organi-
zation is designed to maximize the value of the inventions
produced at least cost, taking into account constraints on both
incentives and technology—in particular the “technology” of
human cognition. Environments that are generally favorable
for investment will be conducive to innovation in particular.
A wider look at the economic development process sug-
gests, however, that much of historical technological change
has occurred without the involvement of such firms. Orga-
nized R&D was rare before the twentieth century; today it
is confined to a relatively small fraction of firms worldwide
and is responsible for only a fraction of innovation. Never-
theless, even when it has other objectives, the firm remains
the main arena of innovation: technological progress can be
an unintended consequence of organizational design. This
Received for publication February 23, 2012. Revision accepted for
publication June 21, 2013. Editor: Philippe Aghion.
* Legros: ECARES and CEPR; Newman: Boston University and CEPR;
Proto: University of Warwick.
We are grateful to the referees for comments and to Daron Acemoglu,
Philippe Aghion, Roland Benabou, Maristella Botticini, Steve Broadberry,
Micael Castanheira, Nick Crafts, Wouter Dessein, Philip Garner, Bob
Margo, Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, Jim Robinson, Ken Sokoloff, Philippe
Weil, and Fabrizio Zilibotti for helpful discussion. P.L. benefited from
the financial support of the Communauté Française de Belgique (project
ARC00/05-252) and the SCIFI-GLOW Collaborative Project supported by
the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme for Research
and Technological Development (contract SSH7-CT- 2008-217436).
1 See, for example, Aghion and Tirole (1994), Garicano and Rossi-
Hansberg (2012), as well as antecedents in the industrial organization
literature, such as Kamien and Schwartz (1974) and Loury (1979). The per-
spective that invention should be understood as endogenous to economic
forces has been forcefully advanced by some of the scholars of “new growth
theory,” including Romer (1986, 1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992).
paper presents a first attempt at modeling this aspect of the
determinants of economic growth.
The Industrial Revolution provides the natural backdrop
for examining the issues. A distinguishing feature of the
period was the rise of the factory system, in which produc-
tion was carried out by workers gathered under one roof, with
strict supervision and discipline and, most important perhaps,
a division of labor. And although a vast literature reveals wide
assent on the importance of the factory system, economic
historians display little consensus—no doubt fueled by the
wide cross-country variation in the manner and timing of its
adoption—on just what role it played in fostering the rapid
technological advances and economic growth that also char-
acterized the era. Some commentators, like Landes (1969),
seem to argue that the factory was epiphenomenal, merely
an optimal organizational response to exogenous technologi-
cal change. Others, like Cohen (1981), Millward (1981), and
North (1981), suggest that it was the enhanced efficiency of
the factory system itself relative to earlier forms of organiza-
tion that generated greater surpluses, though it is difficult to
see how this by itself could plausibly translate into increased
rates of innovation and growth.
A third view, attributable to Adam Smith and echoed by
later writers on the Industrial Revolution such as Charles
Babbage and Amsa Walker, affirms a causal role for the fac-
tory system. It places the emphasis less on its static benefit
of making better use of current inputs to produce current
output than on a dynamic one: the adoption of the factory
and, in particular, the fine division of labor into elemen-
tary tasks, engenders a “cognitive externality” by providing
a superior environment to inspire invention and refinement
of productive techniques. Primarily these inspirations accrue
to persons, such as the occasional workman or an outside
observer, other than the factory’s owner. By focusing an indi-
vidual’s attention, it makes it easier for him to improve on old
techniques. Alternatively, and complementarily, by provid-
ing a model in human form of elementary tasks, it facilitates
the development of machines that can better perform those
tasks.2 This effect seems especially pertinent to understand-
ing the development of micro-inventions, the sustained flow
of which was a crucial element of the Industrial Revolution
(Rosenberg, 1982; Mokyr, 1990).
Now, there is little evidence that anyone during the Indus-
trial Revolution ever built a factory because he expected it to
help him innovate. Given the nonrival nature of ideas and the
2 From Smith Wealth of Nations (1991): “I shall only observe, therefore,
that the invention of all those machines by which labor is so much facili-
tated and abridged seems to have been originally owing to the division of
labor. Men are much more likely to discover easier and readier methods
of attaining any object when the whole attention of their minds is directed
towards that single object that when it is dissipated among great variety of
things.”
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difficulties in excluding them for long, this should not be sur-
prising. More difficult still, but essential for appropriating a
return to establishing a creative organization, would be prov-
ing the source of inspiration for an idea that could be widely
applied. Thus, the creative role of the division of labor could
be harnessed only via some other economic mechanism that
would have induced the widespread adoption of the factory
and the concomitant surge of technical progress.
Fortunately, the division of labor had other benefits, as
Smith himself enumerated. Among them was the enhanced
ability to monitor labor: a worker assigned to only a small
number of tasks is less able to disguise shirking as down-
time between tasks or to find opportunities to embezzle either
inputs or outputs undetected.3 This idea has been rekindled by
the burgeoning literature on multitask principal-agent prob-
lems following Holmström and Milgrom (1991) and Baker
(1992), which highlights the gains from better incentives that
come from reducing the number of tasks assigned to a single
worker. Thus, an entrepreneur could benefit privately from a
fine division of labor, even if she had no interest in its social
benefit in terms of eased invention.
Of course dividing labor does not come for free. There are
lost economies of individual scope from minute task division;
costs of communication among specialized workforces, time
spent coordinating tasks among disparate individuals, and
resources that have to be marshaled for assembling the com-
ponents of the final good produced by each worker (Becker &
Murphy, 1992; Radner & Van Zandt, 1992; Bolton, & Dewa-
tripont, 1994; Garicano, 2000; Dessein & Santos, 2006).
Entrepreneurs would have to trade off the monitoring benefit
of labor division against these coordination costs.
A basic implication of incentive theory is that monitoring
benefits vary with the wage level. In particular, entrepreneurs
would be induced to choose a high level of labor division
only when wages are low, requiring more monitoring (this
relationship between wage and monitoring levels has also
appeared in the efficiency wage literature, e.g., Acemoglu &
Newman, 2002). Thus, conditions in the labor market will
determine an entrepreneur’s choice of labor division and, via
the cognitive externality, the level of technological progress.
Before delving into the mechanism by which the interac-
tion of the monitoring and invention benefits of labor division
can provide an organizational theory of growth, we note that
we are abstracting from the third, well-known benefit of labor
division, which is the first one Smith mentions in Wealth of
Nations: “improved dexterity,” or direct productivity gain.
Because it is more technological than organizational, it pro-
vides less of a clear trade-off that can account for the wide
cross-country variation in degree of labor division and the
3 Also from Smith, Wealth of Nations (1991): “A man commonly saunters
a little when turning his hand from one sort of employment to another.
… The habit of sauntering and of indolent careless application, which is
naturally, or rather necessarily, acquired by every country workman who
is obliged to change his work and his tools every half hour and to apply
his hand in twenty different ways almost every day of his life, renders him
almost always slothful and lazy, and incapable of any vigorous application
even on the most pressing occasions.”
use of the factory system. Thus, when we refer to “division
of labor” or “specialization,” we mean beyond whatever level
at which the marginal improved dexterity equals the marginal
cost of labor division. (See note 10 for further discussion.)
The setting for our investigation is a standard occupational
choice model (Banerjee & Newman, 1993). Individuals are
either workers, who supply imperfectly observable effort
to firms, or entrepreneurs, who hire workers and choose
the degree of labor division within their firms. The market
wage will mediate both the occupational and organizational
choices, since it affects the relative attraction of the occupa-
tions and the returns to monitoring. The relative scarcity of
entrepreneurs and workers determines the wage and, through
it, the organizational design of firms.
A special class of individuals whom we dub “nerds” are
the ones who tinker with the old technology and find ways to
improve it.4 Like everyone else, they respond to incentives,
choosing how much to invest in inventive effort partly on the
basis of how much they expect to earn selling any inventions
they may produce. But the ease of inventing is determined
also by the degree of labor division in the economy’s firms:
fine division makes it easy to invent—for example, to replace
a human performing a simple repetitive task by a machine
that can do the same task much faster. With a coarse divi-
sion of labor, perceiving which aspects of a job are subject
to improvement or mechanical replacement is much more
difficult.5
As in earlier occupational choice models, there are differ-
ent types of equilibria, uniquely determined by the relative
scarcity of entrepreneurs and workers and characterized
in part by the nature of the predominant organizational
forms. But here, equilibria are also characterized by the
accompanying rate of technological innovation.
There is an artisanal equilibrium in which workers are
responsible for a large number of tasks (i.e., a low degree
of labor division) and wage shares are high. There is also
a “factory” equilibrium with finely divided labor and lower
wage shares. The artisanal equilibrium is the statically more
efficient one, since fewer resources are lost to monitoring via
the costly division of labor. But it may be dynamically inef-
ficient in the sense that the innovation rate is low, owing to
the difficulty of inventing under a coarse labor division.
The factory equilibrium, statically wasteful as it may be,
has the potential to generate higher rates of innovation than
the artisanal one. Since it exists only when there are few
entrepreneurs, this might seem to imply that entrepreneurship
actually impedes innovation, the artisanal equilibrium being
4 Making the inventors a special population is mainly for analytical sim-
plicity it would not change things much to assume they are drawn from
the population at large. See Khan and Sokoloff (1993) for evidence on the
social background of inventors during the Industrial Revolution.
5 An alternative and complementary interpretation is suggested by Aoki
(1986): with a coarse division of labor, much of the information about the
various tasks will remain tacit; with a fine division of labor, coordination
may entail formal codification of this knowledge. Once documented, how-
ever, the knowledge becomes more accessible to inventors, which facilitates
technological improvement.
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a case of too much of a good thing. But there is a counter-
vailing effect. Since nerds will be able to sell their inventions
to the entrepreneurs on an innovation market, the investment
decision for an aspiring inventor depends on the extent of this
market: the larger it is, the more revenue is available.
The scarcity of entrepreneurs therefore affects the innova-
tion market as well as the labor market through a market size
effect. When there are relatively many workers, the num-
ber of buyers of inventions is small, and though it may be
easier to invent, the revenue generated will be too small to
justify the effort: the innovation market shuts down.6 At the
other extreme, despite a large demand for innovations that
comes when there are many entrepreneurs, innovation will be
undermined by the difficulty of inventing under the artisanal
mode of firm organization. Moderate ratios of entrepreneurs
to workers, however, keep wage shares low so that special-
ization is high and ideas arrive easily, and at the same time
provide enough of a market to induce people to invent. In short
the model predicts an inverted U-shaped relation between the
fraction of the population who are entrepreneurs and the rate
of technological progress.
For long-run dynamics, the model can generate steady-
state endogenous growth. We endogenize entry into the
occupations by supposing there is a credit market imper-
fection that inhibits those with less than a threshold level
of wealth from becoming entrepreneurs. Thus, the propor-
tion of entrepreneurs will be identified with the fraction
of “rich” agents, which becomes the state variable for the
economy. We demonstrate the existence and local stabil-
ity of steady states in which the static relation between the
entrepreneur-worker (now the rich-poor) ratio and the rate
of innovation and growth is maintained in the long run. An
economy initially with many poor will tend to collapse to
a pure subsistence equilibrium. One with many rich will
make technological change slow or nonexistent, though it
may appear statically affluent, with a high wage share and few
resources lost to coordinating divided labor. Only economies
that initially have moderate inequality will be able to sustain a
high rate of steady-state innovation and growth.7 We discuss
how the basins of attraction of these steady states depend on
institutional factors such as the quality of financial markets,
the complexity of technology, and, most important, organi-
zational innovations such as the demise of the putting-out
system and rise of the factory.
These results suggest a possible explanation for the vener-
able economic historians’ conundrum of why Britain among
European nations was first to industrialize. Compared with
some of its continental counterparts (notably France), in the
6 Something like this size effect can be gleaned by comparing industries in
eighteenth-century Britain. Watchmaking had a fine division of labor going
back at least a century earlier, but it served only a small (luxury) market
and thus never experienced the high levels of innovation that affected other
industries such as cotton and steel (Mathias, 1983).
7 As far as we know, such an inverted-U relationship between inequality
and innovation is new to the literature. In our case, inequality not only
governs the innovation rate, but also is influenced by it, since it is determined
in part by the incomes accruing to the inventors.
late eighteenth century, both had similar levels of technol-
ogy, some form of patent system, free labor markets, and
(as in our model) only rudimentary and imperfect credit
markets. Yet France remained a nation of family farms and
small enterprise for several decades, while Britain rapidly
became a nation of factories and the seat of the Industrial
Revolution (Deane, 1965; Shapiro, 1967; O’Brien & Key-
der, 1978; Crafts, 1985; Crouzet, 1990; Mokyr, 1990). One
difference was the distribution of wealth, which was rather
more unequal in England (Clapham, 1936; Grantham, 1975;
Soltow, 1980). Other slow-to-industrialize countries, such as
(northern) Italy, had greater inequality than Britain in the
same period.
In addition, the analysis offers a novel perspective on
precisely how the organizational innovation that was the fac-
tory contributed to the Industrial Revolution. Centralizing
production under one roof (the “manufactory”) rather than
decentralizing it in workers’ cottages (the putting-out sys-
tem) would have reduced the cost of dividing labor (e.g.,
lower costs of transporting partly finished products from one
worker to the next), even though logically, one might have
had a very fine division of labor under putting out as well.
It would also have increased the monitoring benefit, since
enforcement of rules against straying from one’s work sta-
tion obviously would have been cheaper to enforce in the
manufactory than under putting out. Thus, the adoption of
the manufactory would have led to a finer division of labor,
facilitating invention, as we have suggested, and ultimately
giving us the Industrial Revolution. Of course, the manufac-
tory did not accomplish this in isolation. Certain accessory
institutional and distributional conditions were satisfied as
well, in Britain especially. We shall have more to say on this
in the section V.
II. The Basic Model
In this section we consider a static model in which the
occupation of each agent is exogenous. In the next section, we
extend the model dynamically: agents make an occupational
choice that is partially constrained by their wealth, which
evolves endogenously.
A. Agents and Timing
Economic activity takes place at two dates, 1 and 2. At each
date, there is a measure 1 − η of normal individuals who are
economically active; of these, r are entrepreneurs and 1 − r
are workers. In addition, there are η nerds who are active at
both dates (they are “young” at date 1 and “old” at date 2).
All agents are risk neutral and are endowed with a unit of
effort: normal agents use it to produce the economy’s single
consumption good; nerds use it to produce inventions.
Entrepreneurs can each hire up to n ≥ 2 workers or can
operate on their own in artisan firms. Young nerds observe
the production process carried out by the normals active at
date 1. Those who succeed in finding an idea for improving
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technology may enter the innovation market to sell their
inventions to the entrepreneurs who are active at date 2.
B. Production
Technology. Production of the consumption good
involves a unit measure of jobs indexed by j ∈ [0, 1].
The labor productivity for job j is a( j), and output is
exp(
∫ 1
0 log[a( j)l( j)]dj), where l ( j) is the labor allocated tojob j. Given this technology, labor is uniformly allocated over
all jobs independent of a (·) . Output per unit labor is therefore
A ≡ exp(∫ 10 log a( j)dj).
A firm’s output is linear in the number of workers hired,
up to the scale n. If the entrepreneur operates on his own
without workers, he produces αA, where n/2 ≥ α ≥ 1. Thus,
if an entrepreneur hires any workers at all, he must be making
positive profit from each and therefore will hire n of them.
We use a quality ladder approach for modeling techni-
cal progress (Grossman & Helpman, 1991). An invention
improves the productivity of a single job by the multiplica-
tive factor (1 + γ). If m( j) improvements are implemented
on job j, its productivity becomes a′( j) = (1 + γ)m( j)a( j).8
The technology operated by the entrepreneurs at date
1 is A. This technology is freely available to the date 2
entrepreneurs, though typically they will choose to improve
it: if they purchase m innovations, the new technology is
A′ = A(1 + γ)m where m = ∫ 10 m( j)dj. Since each nerd
can have at most one invention, we have m ≤ η < 1.
Contractibility assumptions. We make the following
assumptions:
1. Worker effort is imperfectly observable; the degree
of imperfection depends negatively on the division of
labor.
2. Individual output is not contractible.
3. The source of ideas is not attributable; hence,
entrepreneurs cannot claim ownership of them.
4. Nerd effort is not observable.
As we discussed in section I, the first assumption pro-
vides the basis on which the division of labor benefits
entrepreneurs. The second assumption prevents the use of
output contingent contracts such as piece rates.9 The last
8 Thus, one job may be improved an indefinite number of times. This
is a simplifying assumption that avoids the computation of the individual
returns to inventing when there is a possibility of duplication or diminished
returns. Our conclusions would not be altered substantially if it were relaxed,
and it gives the best chance for innovation via the Smithian mechanism. It
is also convenient for representing steady-state growth without the added
complication of providing a theory of how new sectors come into being
during the development process.
9 This is only for simplicity. Indeed, it is well understood from the multi-
tasking literature that piece rates create poor incentives for quality provision.
One solution is to separate tasks; thus, piece rates and labor division are
complementary in much the same way as input monitoring and labor divi-
sion. As it happens, available evidence suggests that piece rates were not
widely used during the Industrial Revolution (Huberman, 1996).
two assumptions are the reasons that entrepreneurs do not
internalize the effects of labor division on invention: the third
one prevents contracting with a nerd on the contingency that
he obtained an idea because of the entrepreneur’s organi-
zational choice; combined with the last assumption, it pre-
vents entrepreneurs from establishing “invention factories,”
wherein they hire nerds to produce ideas in return for wages.
Division of labor. Here we describe how the division
of labor is modeled and how it facilitates monitoring. The
set of jobs can be subdivided into a number of (equal-size)
components. Denoting their number by σ, each one contains
1/σ jobs; hence, σ = 1 corresponds to the early manufac-
turing days where artisans were put under the same roof but
continued to do all the jobs involved in producing the good,
while σ ≥ 2 may correspond to an assembly-line system.
Workers are specialized in producing individual components;
given the production technology, in order to produce a unit
of the good, it is necessary to combine 1 unit of each of the
σ components.
When σ = 1, a worker spreads his unit of labor time uni-
formly over all the jobs; hence a worker has to spend 1/σ of
units of labor time to produce one unit of a component con-
sisting of 1/σ jobs. Absent coordination problems, it does not
make a difference in terms of total output whether each of n
workers does all the jobs (is completely unspecialized) or is
σ-specialized, with n/σ workers assigned to each component
and producing σ components each: either way, output is nA.
However, as in Becker and Murphy (1992), we assume that
specialization generates coordination problems. For instance,
in an assembly line, each worker has to spend time taking
the component from the previous worker in line, assem-
bling it with his own component, and passing everything
to the next component. In many firms producing complex
products, seamless integration between components often
requires a large number of meetings, reducing time available
for production.
When there are σ components, each worker specialized in
one component will have to spend time coordinating with
σ − 1 producers of the other components, and the cost in
time units is c(σ − 1), with c > 0. Hence, total time avail-
able for production is now only 1 − c(σ − 1), so a worker
can produce σ(1 − c(σ − 1)) components. Since there are n
workers per firm, n/σ workers are assigned to each compo-
nent, and if the entrepreneur’s technology is A, total output
is n(1 − c(σ − 1))A.
Compensating for the coordination cost of specialization
is its monitoring benefit.10 In our model, a worker shirks not
so much by withholding effort but by engaging in a sideline
10 As already mentioned, we assume there is no net output gain from
specialization (unlike, e.g., Costinot, 2009); that is, we consider situa-
tions where the cost of coordination dominates the productivity gains from
specialization. If there are diminishing returns to specialization in this
dimension (Smith himself suggests this: see the discussion at the end of
section IIC) without a concomitant fall in coordination costs, the net effect
of specialization on productivity is first positive and then negative as special-
ization increases. Since the monitoring benefit increases with specialization,
it is profit maximizing in the first region to increase specialization. We can
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activity—for instance, diverting parts to assemble and sell
himself—that has a return μA, μ < 1, where A is the technol-
ogy available within the firm. It is not possible to distinguish
whether a worker is doing a job for the firm or for himself, but
it is possible to observe which job he is doing. If a worker is
assigned to a component consisting of 1/Ïf jobs and he decides
to shirk, he will spend 1/Ïf of his time on those jobs, and the
rest on jobs outside his assigned component. If he works, he
spends all of his time on a assigned jobs. Random monitoring
will therefore detect shirking with probability 1−1/σ; hence,
the higher the level of labor division σ, the more effective is
monitoring.
Labor contracting. On the labor market, entrepreneurs
offer contracts (σ, w) consisting of a degree of specialization
σ and a wage w normalized to the state of technology A that
is paid only if the worker is not caught shirking.
If the worker is caught shirking, it is optimal to punish him
maximally: he loses both his wage wA and the “booty” μA.
Since the shirking worker escapes detection with probabil-
ity 1/σ, shirking yields him a benefit of (w + μ) A/σ, while
working yields wA. Thus, the worker will shirk unless the
following incentive compatibility condition holds:
w ≥ μ
σ − 1 . (1)
Admissible contracts (σ, w) must satisfy equation (1) as well
as a participation constraint.
Observe that higher μ implies higher σ, given the wage.
Evidence on factory organization in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries is consistent with this prediction.
Factories producing easily embezzled goods (high μ) had
higher degrees of labor division than others: watches, for
example—valuable goods that could easily be stolen and sold
for close to full market value—were produced by a minute
division of labor from the early eighteenth century (Mathias,
1983; Thompson, 1963). Similarly luxury-market-oriented
goods such as coaches and pianos (low μ) were still pro-
duced using traditional techniques as late as the 1830s.11 In
addition to this monitoring effect, smaller components would
often tend to have thinner markets, making them less tempt-
ing to embezzle (that is, μ could be a decreasing function of
σ, which would reinforce the decreasing relationship between
the wage and the degree of division of labor expressed
in condition (1). More broadly, economic historians have
then interpret σ = 1 as a normalization, the maximum degree of specializa-
tion for which there are net output gains. If direct gains from specialization
were the only appropriable benefit of the division of labor, the question
of whether there is economic growth is reduced to the exogenous para-
metric question of whether specialization gains diminish quickly or slowly
enough relative to the innovation gains. Moreover, as we note at the end of
the “Labor Contracting” section, the monitoring benefit also predicts a pos-
itive correlation between productivity and specialization, so the evidence
for the productivity benefit must be interpreted with care.
11 See Dodd (1843) for descriptions of piano and coach factories. Pollard
(1965) offers similar evidence that in shipbuilding or housing (both low-μ),
production remained organized around the individual craftsman well into
the nineteenth century.
emphasized embezzlement and eliciting worker effort as
major concerns in shaping the organization of the first fac-
tories and as the chief reasons for the factory system’s
supplantation of the putting-out system (Clark, 1994; Pollard,
1965).12
Suppose a firm has technology A, and let u∗ be the outside
option of a worker. The contract that a firm offers solves the
program
max
(w,σ)
n(1 − c(σ − 1) − w)A
s.t.
w ≥ μ
σ − 1 (2)
wA ≥ u∗, (3)
where equation (2) is the worker incentive compatibility
constraint and equation (3) is the participation constraint.
The incentive constraint binds: if it does not, the
entrepreneur can increase her profit by lowering σ. Writing
π(w) ≡ n(1 − cμ/w − w), the problem reduces to
max
w
Aπ(w)
s.t.
wA ≥ u∗.
The unconstrained maximum occurs at w = √cμ, with con-
comitant specialization σ = (1 + √μ/c) and normalized
profit π(w) = n (1 − 2√cμ). Clearly, if the labor market
is ever to be active, entrepreneurs must prefer to hire workers
(use n ≥ 2) rather than work by themselves (in which case,
their normalized income is α) when the wage assumes this
minimum value, that is, 2n√cμ < n − α. We assume that
this condition holds for all α in the allowed range [1, n/2],
that is:
Assumption 1: √cμ < 14 .
The equilibrium wage share is a function of u∗. For low
values, entrepreneurs are not constrained and can choose
w. For high values, the participation constraint binds, and
entrepreneurs increase the wage beyond w and choose less
specialization.
Observe that when the participation constraint binds, if
one firm has better technology than another, it will also have a
finer division of labor. Since wA = u∗, raising A lowers w and
therefore raises σ: a firm with higher A has more to pilfer (or
more to lose when its workers shirk), and this must be offset
by more intensive monitoring. Thus, the model would predict
12 Pollard (1965, p.184) discusses work rules that resulted in dismissal for
being “found a yard out of his ground,” or fines for being “found from the
usual place of work, except for necessary purposes, or talking to anyone out
of their own Ally [sic],” which would be difficult to implement and enforce
without a high level of labor division. Except for products that could be
assembled on a small table, a worker with wide responsibility would likely
have to wander around the factory and talk to numerous other workers.
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a positive correlation between productivity and specializa-
tion in a cross-section of heterogeneous firms, but higher
productivity is the cause, not the consequence, of greater
specialization.
Invention. Entrepreneurs choose the degree of special-
ization by considering only the trade-off between coordina-
tion costs and monitoring benefits. What they do not consider
is that specialization also affects how easily other agents can
find ways to improve the productivity of tasks. These agents
are represented by the nerds in our model.
A nerd can generate an idea on how to improve one job.
If he cogitates during his youth, he observes the state-of-the-
art technology A together with the division of labor σ. He
then randomly selects a component for study and arrives at
an idea for improvement to one of the tasks in his component
with probability p (σ), where p (·) is an increasing function.
If instead he vegetates, he simply generates θA (θ < 1) units
of the consumption good for himself.
If an invention is obtained, the nerd becomes active on
the innovation market when he is old and anticipates sell-
ing his invention at a license price of q. With a measure of
entrepreneurs equal to (1 − η)r, he obtains (1 − η)rq for his
invention, and cogitation is worthwhile only if
(1 − η)rp (σ) q ≥ Aθ. (4)
The derivation of q is deferred to section C.
C. Markets and Prices
At date 1, all entrepreneurs possess the technology A, and
the wage w and degree of specialization σ are determined in
the labor market. Nerds then observe the production process,
and, if they have the incentives to cogitate, invent with prob-
ability p(σ). At the second date, an innovation market as well
as the labor market are active, and we think of them as open-
ing in that sequence. Demand in both markets is generated by
the entrepreneurs. The workers form the supply side of the
labor market, while the old nerds who successfully invented
when they were young supply the innovation market.
Labor market. Since entrepreneurs who hire workers will
always choose to do so at the maximum scale n, labor market
equilibrium will generically involve one of only two levels of
the wage share w. This will correspond to a case of excess sup-
ply of workers and a case of excess demand for them; in the
latter situation, equilibrium requires an entrepreneur’s indif-
ference between hiring workers and operating the technology
himself.
The labor market condition is reflected in the utility u∗
that has to be guaranteed to a worker. Recall that the measure
of entrepreneurs is r(1 − η), while that of workers is (1 −
r)(1 − η). If nr < 1 − r, that is, r < rˆ ≡ 1/(n + 1), supply
exceeds demand, and the normal agents who are not hired
obtain a payoff of zero. Since entrepreneurs can always find
a worker who will accept any positive wage, they are not
constrained—we can take u∗ = 0, and the equilibrium wage
will be w.
If r > rˆ when the labor market opens, the participation
constraint—equation (3) in the entrepreneur’s problem—
binds, and u∗ will be bid up until the potential entrepreneurs
are indifferent between hiring workers and operating on their
own: the corresponding wage share w, with division of labor
σ, satisfies π(w) = α, since by operating on his own, an
entrepreneur can get αA. (In the nongeneric case in which the
labor market is just balanced (r = rˆ), any u∗ corresponding
to a wage share in [w, w] is consistent with market clearing.)
From the perspective of the entrepreneur, the lower output
brought by specialization is the price to pay for maintaining
a larger profit share. High degrees of specialization reduce
aggregate output: a larger wage share would result in greater
output but smaller profits for entrepreneurs. However, from a
dynamic perspective, specialization may enhance growth of
aggregate output insofar as it facilitates invention.
Innovation market. Suppose that a measure m < η of old
nerds found ideas when young and now are bringing them to
market. Each of these inventors has a monopoly on his idea
and can offer it to all takers. Since improvements to each job
enter symmetrically in the profit function, each entrepreneur
cares only about the total number k of inventions he acquires
and wants at most one copy of each. The situation therefore
conforms to a case of multiproduct monopoly in which each
producer can offer his product at zero marginal cost.
Trade in the innovation market takes place as follows:
(a) simultaneously, each inventor sets a price for his idea;
(b) each entrepreneur, taking these prices as given, chooses
which inventions to purchase; (c) inventors incorporate their
invention in the production process of the entrepreneurs who
have agreed to purchase them.13 An equilibrium of the innova-
tion market is defined by a license price qi for each inventor
i and an adoption strategy kl for each entrepreneur l. Tak-
ing the other inventors’ prices q−i, the labor market outside
option of workers u∗, and the adoption strategies as given, an
individual inventor does not want to modify his price. Tak-
ing the prices qi and u∗ as given, an entrepreneur does not
want to modify his adoption strategy. We focus on symmetric
(in license price) equilibria and assume that inventors cannot
price-discriminate among entrepreneurs (e.g., based on their
future scale of operation).
If A is the level of technology that prevailed last period,
the level for an entrepreneur who acquires k inventions is
A(k) = A(1 + γ)k , which is increasing and convex in k.
Denote the payoff to an entrepreneur who adopts k inventions
and faces outside option u∗ by V(k, u∗). The value of adopting
k inventions is then V(k, u∗) − V(0, u∗).
13 For instance, the idea might be embodied in a part or equipment that
the inventor installs. We want to avoid situations where the entrepreneur
obtains the idea from an inventor and starts competing with him on the
market for inventions. This possibility can only decrease the return from
inventive activity and make growth more unlikely.
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Now, V(k, u∗) incorporates the entrepreneur’s scale deci-
sion (whether to operate as an artisan or hire workers) and
the status of the participation constraint (whether it binds).
The important property of V(k, u∗) is convexity in k, which
it inherits from A(k). This is easy to see if the entrepreneur
is an artisan (V(k, u∗) = αA(k)) or is unconstrained in the
labor market (V(k, u∗) = A(k)π(w)). In the appendix, we
show that convexity holds in the general case as well.
Convexity effectively weakens competition among inven-
tors, since the marginal return from adoption is increas-
ing. Assuming qi = q in a symmetric equilibrium, the
entrepreneur who maximizes V(k, u∗) − qk will choose
k = m, that is, buy all available inventions, as long as
q ≤ Vk(m, u∗) and V(m, u∗) − qm ≥ V(0, u∗). Putting
q = [V(m, u∗)−V(0, u∗)]/m, which is less than Vk(m, u∗) by
convexity, satisfies both of these conditions. (If q were lower
than [V(m, u∗)− V(0, u∗)]/m, an inventor could increase his
profit by raising his price a bit and the entrepreneurs would
still purchase all of the inventions.) That this is the unique
symmetric equilibrium follows from an argument in Tauman,
Urbano, and Watanabe (1997) in their analysis of multiprod-
uct price competition. Notice that in this equilibrium, the
inventors extract all of the surplus from the entrepreneurs.14
Write w(r) and σ(r) to denote the dependence of the
equilibrium wage and labor division on the measure of
entrepreneurs (from the labor market analysis, the wage is
generically w or w, labor division σ or σ, and the normalized
profit π(w) or π(w) = α, as r < rˆ or r > rˆ). The above
discussion can be summarized in the following:
Lemma 1:
i. Let m be the measure of inventions available at the
beginning of the second period. In any symmetric
equilibrium of the invention market, all entrepreneurs
purchase the m inventions.
ii. There exists a unique symmetric price equilibrium:
q(r, m) = π(w(r))(A(m) − A)
m
.
Note that r > rˆ implies q(r, m) = α[A(m) − A]/m, while
if r < rˆ, we have q(r, m) = π(w)[A(m) − A]/m. Since
[A(m) − A]/m = [(1 + γ)m − 1]A/m, it is readily calculated
that q(r, m) is an increasing function of m and that q(r, 0) =
Aπ(w(r)) log(1 + γ).
General equilibrium. We are now ready to determine the
overall equilibrium of our economy by taking account of the
nerds’ cogitation decisions. The fact that the license price
14 In the finite case, there will typically be asymmetric equilibria as well,
but in every case, entrepreneurs purchase all innovations and the surplus
is fully extracted by the inventors. Tauman et al. (1997) show that the set
of equilibria corresponds to the core of a cooperative game among the
inventors, and we conjecture that as the number of goods gets large (our
case), the set of equilibria shrinks so that only the symmetric equilibrium
remains in the limit.
increases in the number of inventions leads to a strategic
complementarity in cogitation. This raises the possibility of
multiple (Pareto-ranked) equilibria, though we shall mainly
be concerned with the Pareto optimal equilibrium and how
its properties depend on the fundamentals of the economy.
Suppose that a fraction φ ∈ (0, 1) of the nerds choose to
cogitate at date 1. Then almost surely there will be φp(σ)η
inventions on the market at date 2. This is an equilibrium only
if p(σ(r))r(1 − η)q(r, φp(σ)η) = θA (if the left-hand side is
less than the right, cogitating nerds would want to vegetate;
if greater, the vegetators would want to cogitate). But since
q(r, φp(σ)η) is increasing in φ, a single vegetating nerd—
there must be some, since φ < 1—can gain by switching to
cogitation (strictly speaking, this is not true in the continuum
limit, but it is true of any finite economy that it approximates).
Thus, the only possibilities for equilibrium are that all nerds
cogitate or none do.
There is an equilibrium in which the innovation market is
inactive if and only if
p(σ(r))r(1 − η)q(r, 0) < θA (5)
and an equilibrium with an active innovation market if and
only if
p(σ(r))r(1 − η)q(r, p(σ(r))η) ≥ θA. (6)
If r is sufficiently small, equation (5) is satisfied, while equa-
tion (6) cannot be. Thus, when there are few entrepreneurs,
the innovation market is inactive because the market for
innovations is too small to encourage inventive activity.
What about larger values of r? Suppose that r < rˆ, so that
w = w. Then condition (6) is satisfied when r also exceeds a
threshold value r > 0 satisfying
r(1 − η)p(σ)π(w) (1 + γ)
p(σ)η − 1
p(σ)η
= θ,
that is,
r = θη
(1 − η)π(w)[(1 + γ)p(σ)η − 1] .
Clearly, parameters can be chosen (in particular, let θ be
small) so that r < rˆ. In this case, there is a general equilibrium
of the economy in which (w, σ) = (w, σ) and the innovation
market is active. The rate of technological improvement A′/A
between dates 1 and 2 is (1 + γ)p(σ)η. If r > rˆ, there are no
values of r in which this high level of innovation can occur,
since the innovation market is inactive for all r ∈ [0, rˆ].
There is also a threshold value r˜ of r below which the inac-
tive innovation market equilibrium exists and above which it
does not as long as the wage is w. It is straightforward to check
that r˜ > r and that r˜ < rˆ for appropriate choice of parame-
ters. Thus, there is a nonempty set of r values in which the two
equilibria coexist. The cogitation equilibrium Pareto domi-
nates the vegetating equilibrium: nerds and date 2 workers
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benefit from the technological improvements, though (date
1) workers and all entrepreneurs are indifferent.
Since we are interested in the possibility of growth and
since multiple equilibria of this kind have been dealt with
elsewhere in the literature on growth and development (Mur-
phy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1989; Greif, 1994; Mokyr, 2005),
we shall focus on the Pareto optimal equilibrium, except for
a brief discussion in section V.
For the case r > rˆ, a similar argument establishes the
existence of a threshold r ≡ θη/{(1−η)π(w)[(1+γ)p(σ)η −
1]}, above which the innovation market is active. Of course,
if p(σ) is small enough, r may exceed 1, so that there is never
innovation in the artisanal labor market equilibrium. More
generally, even if the innovation market is active, the rate
of innovation is lower than it is in the factory equilibrium
(r < rˆ) than in the artisanal equilibrium. (There is also a
corresponding r˜ > r below which the inactive innovation
market equilibrium exists, though this shall not play much
role in our analysis.)
The preceding discussion highlights the interaction
between the markets for innovations and for workers. When
there is excess supply of workers, the wage is small and spe-
cialization is high, making invention relatively easy. If all
nerds exert effort, many inventions are offered on the mar-
ket, and by convexity of their value to entrepreneurs, the
price of a license is high. This would suggest that nerds
indeed have strong incentives to search for inventions. How-
ever, if r is too small, the revenue rq may be so small that
the expected return from invention is small compared to
its cost.
When there is excess demand for workers, there are many
entrepreneurs who could pay for innovations. However, spe-
cialization is low, and since the probability of discovery
is now small, there can be only a few inventors active on
the invention market. The price of the license will be small
because entrepreneurial profits are small and because there
are fewer innovations. Coupled with the low probability of
success, incentives to invent are small in this case.
Therefore, there will be weak cogitation incentives when
there are too few or too many entrepreneurs: in the first
case, there is not enough demand for innovation to cover
its cost, while in the second case, high wage shares and
low specialization make invention less probable as well as
less remunerative. It is only in the intermediate range that
high rates of innovation will happen: both the demand for
inventions and the probability of discovery are high.
We summarize this discussion with the main result of this
section.
Proposition 1: Let r < rˆ.
i. If r ∈ [0, r], the equilibrium labor contract is (w, σ),
but there is no innovation.
ii. If r ∈ [r, rˆ], there is an equilibrium with labor con-
tract (w, σ) and an active innovation market with
technological improvement rate g ≡ (1 + γ)p(σ)η.
iii. If r > rˆ, the equilibrium labor contract is (w, σ). For
r ∈ (rˆ, r) there is no innovation; for r ∈ [r, 1] the
improvement rate is g ≡ (1 + γ)p(σ)η.
Note that it is possible that one of the intervals in part
(iii) is empty; either way, the growth rate of technology is
nonmonotonic as r varies over [0, 1]. There can be both too
much as well as too little entrepreneurship (as measured by r)
for innovation. When there are many entrepreneurs, individu-
als work in firms with little labor division, similar to artisanal
systems of production. Few resources (here measured by cσ)
are wasted in supervision. In this sense the economy is stat-
ically efficient since output per capita is high relative to the
state of technology. But it is dynamically inefficient since it
produces innovations at a low rate and technology is likely
to be relatively backward.
The market size effect that drives the low innovation
rate when entrepreneurs are scarce is a consequence of our
assumption that each entrepreneur may hire up to n workers
and therefore faces an extreme form of decreasing returns
to scale.15 Little would change with a more flexible pro-
duction technology that allows entrepreneurs to hire any
number of workers as long as returns decline fast enough. For
instance, in the standard competitive model in which output
per entrepreneur is given by a smooth production function
F(), where  is the number of workers hired and F(·) sat-
isfies standard properties, in particular the “Inada” condition
lim→∞F ′() = 0, aggregate profit is r[F()− w], where w
is the equilibrium wage. Since r = 1 − r and F ′() = w in
equilibrium (here we ignore the worker incentive problem,
which does not affect the argument), the aggregate profit is
rF
( 1−r
r
)−(1−r)F ′( 1−r
r
)
, which is bounded above by rF
( 1
r
)
.
It is straightforward to see (use l’Hôpital’s rule and the Inada
condition) that the latter expression converges to 0 as r → 0:
profit per firm grows too slowly to counter the effect of the
reduction in their number. Scarcity of entrepreneurs might
also reduce the monopoly power of inventors, decreasing the
share of profits they can extract, and further reducing their
cogitation incentives.
Smith famously argued, in what many have interpreted
as self-contradiction, that the high level of specialization he
observed in factories was counterproductive, requiring gov-
ernment intervention: the worker “becomes as stupid and
ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become.”
Viewed from the perspective of the present model, there is
no contradiction: it is the nerds, not the workers, who gen-
erate the ideas. More generally, in a world of externalities,
such as the one depicted here, this is exactly what one might
expect: the equilibrium degree of labor division may well be
too high, likely in the range of negative marginal productivity
returns, because of the monitoring benefit. Even if workers
15 Beside the usual technological origins of decreasing returns (e.g.,
limited entrepreneurial time or attention to market goods or organize
production), financial contracting problems could also limit scale if r is
interpreted as a fraction of the population with sufficient wealth (see the
next section) and production requires capital as well as labor.
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were responsible for inventing (so p[σ] might be decreasing
for high levels of σ), entrepreneurs would have little reason
to fully internalize the effects of labor division on worker
ignorance, offering another reason that too much inequality
would harm the rate innovation.
III. Dynamics
In this section we extend our model by endogenizing
the occupational distribution and illustrating that the three
regimes discussed in proposition 1 can be steady states.
The model displays endogenous growth; the novelty here is
that growth is driven by organizational design rather than a
technical progress production function.
A. The Dynamic Model
Consider the above economy repeating itself infinitely
often. In each period t = 1, 2, ... every one of the continuum
of individuals gives birth to one offspring; with probability η,
independent across lineages and periods, the child is a nerd;
otherwise he is normal. Normalize the size of the population
born at each period to be unity.
All individuals live for two periods and consume only in
old age, when they also give birth. Normal individuals are
idle in youth and active (as workers or entrepreneurs) in old
age. Nerds are active in youth and, once they have cashed in
on their inventions, idle in old age. Individuals born at time t
have preferences characterized by the utility
Ut(ct , bt) = γc1−βt bβt ,
where ct is generation t consumption, bt is a monetary
investment made by the parent in the child’s human capital,
1 > β > 0, and γ = β−β(1 − β)β−1. Indirect utility is there-
fore equal to the net lifetime income yt , and the investment
is βyt .
The key assumption is that there is a credit market
imperfection—the parental investment effectively deter-
mines the (normal) child’s occupation. We model this by
supposing that there is a minimum threshold investment hAt
for access into entrepreneurship. This may be interpreted as
the cost of sufficient education, of a set of contacts, or even
the physical capital to set the child up in business for himself
as long as it is unaffected by technological improvements.
Then its cost rises with the general level of technology.16
Finally, we allow the improved technology A′t from one
generation to diffuse completely to become the current
technology At+1 for the next.
We continue to assume r < rˆ. To keep the analysis as
simple as possible, we impose some additional conditions on
16 This sort of assumption has appeared elsewhere in the literature on
growth with credit constraints (Mookherjee & Ray, 2002). While education
or contacts are clear candidates to satisfy the requirement, so would cer-
tain types of physical capital: there was, for instance, little technological
change in building construction over the course of the Industrial Revolution
(Pollard, 1965).
the parameters. First, we assume that p(σ) is small enough
that r > 1. Next, we impose:
Assumption 2: α > w g.
This implies that entrepreneurship, even at its smallest
scale, is preferable to working, even at the highest possi-
ble equilibrium wage; that way, in any equilibrium, agents
whose parents set them up in business actually want to remain
entrepreneurs. (Recall that if there is innovation in artisanal
equilibrium, an entrepreneur’s income is αA, while a worker
gets wA′; A′/A may be as high as g because the growth rate is
determined in the previous period by the degree of specializa-
tion that prevailed then.) Alternatively, one could suppose that
there is a high enough “private benefit” to entrepreneurship.
Assumption 3:
i. βw < h and βθ < h: Children of low-wage workers and
of vegetating nerds cannot access entrepreneurship.
ii. βw > h and βθ/p(σ) ≥ hg: Normal children of high-
wage workers and normal children of inventors can be
entrepreneurs.
These conditions avoid trivialities: if children of low-wage
workers are not wealth constrained, all agents are rich after
the first generation; if children of high-wage workers and
of inventors are wealth constrained, then the proportion of
rich in the economy declines and the economy always ends
up at subsistence. (The second part of ii is equivalent to
β(1 − η)rq(r, p(σ)η) > hA′, the condition that inventors in
the factory equilibrium can afford entrepreneurship for their
children; it implies that inventors in the artisanal equilibrium
can afford it as well.)
Nothing of significance turns on assumption 2 or its alter-
native; if it is violated, the analysis of equilibrium in case
of excess labor demand becomes slightly more cumbersome
because the ex-post indifference of entrepreneurs between
hiring workers and operating on their own must be replaced
by ex-ante indifference between entrepreneurship and work-
ing, taking account of innovation costs; this forces the labor
market into balance ex post, lowers the highest equilib-
rium wage somewhat, and eliminates the possibility that
entrepreneurs operate at small scale. The qualitative rela-
tionship between wealth distribution and innovation remains
unchanged.
Similarly, neither the form of the parental investment
motive (here it is of the “warm glow” variety) nor the fact
that the parent invests directly rather than transferring cash
to the child is important here. Other bequest motives would
also have the threshold effects we will be exploiting below.
So would allowing the child to take account of the invest-
ment cost in choosing occupations. In both cases, the analysis
would be slightly more complicated, raising similar issues to
those raised by violations of assumption 2.
SMITHIAN GROWTH THROUGH CREATIVE ORGANIZATION 805
B. Analysis
The important point to note is that if investment is less than
h, the normal child is a worker (the nerd does not need the
investment, and it would make no difference to the analysis
if we simply assumed that his parent did not invest for him at
all). We shall call children whose parents invest more than h
“rich” and the rest “poor.” Thus, the children of (successful)
inventors, entrepreneurs, and workers when the wage is high
are rich.
The state variable is rt . The above assumptions imply the
following:
Lemma 2:
i. If rt < r, then rt+1 = (1 − η)rt.
ii. If r ≤ rt < rˆ, then rt+1 = (1 − η)rt + ηp(σ).
iii. If rt > rˆ, rt = 1 − η.
Proof.
i. There is excess supply but the condition for an operative
invention market is not satisfied; workers get a low
wage w and their children cannot be entrepreneurs. The
only ones who can are the offspring of entrepreneurs;
since their profits exceed w¯, by assumption 3 they can
invest hAt .
ii. There is excess supply, hence the wage is w, but now the
invention market is operative. As before, normal chil-
dren of entrepreneurs can be entrepreneurs, and there
are (1−η)rt of them. By assumption 3, the ηp(σ) inven-
tors will invest enough to give their normal children
access to entrepreneurship.
iii. There is excess demand, hence high wages, and all
children of normals can become entrepreneurs.
There are two or three steady states, depending on whether
the fix point r∗ (= p(σ)) of (1 − η)rt−1 + ηp(σ) lies in [r, rˆ).
In either case, all steady states are locally stable.
If r∗ < r, we are in the “dismal case”: the two steady
states are r = 0 and r = 1 − η : both cases are incom-
patible with growth. When r = 0, the equilibrium is an
economy of pure subsistence where each individual produces
Aμ. The case r = 1 − η by contrast is a statically prosper-
ous economy in which almost everyone invests and becomes
a small-scale entrepreneur; this implies that there is stagna-
tion because of the low degree of specialization. Subsistence
eventually occurs if the economy starts below r; stagnant
prosperity results if it begins above r. There might, however,
be a short period of innovation in case the economy happens
to start in [r, rˆ], but collapse into subsistence soon follows
(see figure 1).
A slightly less dismal case occurs if r∗ > rˆ; in this case,
p(σ) is relatively large, and the (1−η)rt−1+ηp(σ) branch lies
above the 45◦ line. Permanent high growth is not possible,
though again the economy may experience growth for a few
Figure 1.—The Dismal Case (r > r∗): Slow or No Growth
Figure 2.—The Hopeful Case (r < r∗ < rˆ): High Growth
periods. The basin of attraction for subsistence is smaller than
in the dismal case, consisting of only the interval [0, r).
The case of greatest interest is the “hopeful” one in which
r ≤ r∗ < rˆ, in which there is another locally stable steady
state at r∗. Any economy beginning in the interval [r, rˆ) con-
verges to r∗. Here the wage share is low and there is a high
degree of division of labor and a technological growth rate
of (1 + γ)ηp(σ) (see figure 2).
(If r > rˆ, then we are in a truly dismal case where the inno-
vation market is never operative and the economy proceeds
to either subsistence or prosperous stagnation.)
Note that except in the nongeneric case that r∗ = rˆ, the
economy cannot spend any time at rˆ unless it happens to start
there, so we are justified in ignoring the cases of intermediate
wages.
The hopeful case depicted in figure 2 is the one that sug-
gests the possibility of an inverse-U relation between the
degree of inequality (measured by 1/r) and the rate of growth:
economies with either high or low degrees of inequality (low
or high r) grow slowly or not at all, while those with middling
levels are the ones that generate sustained technical progress.
The discussion can be summarized in the following:
Proposition 2: Let r < r∗ < rˆ, and the fraction of rich at
t = 0 be r0.
i. If r0 ∈ [0, r), the sequence {rt} converges to the
subsistence steady state with zero growth.
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ii. If r0 ∈ [r, rˆ), the sequence {rt} converges to r∗ and
the economy has a steady-state growth rate of g ≡
(1 + γ)p(σ)η.
iii. If r0 > rˆ, the sequence {rt} converges to 1−η and there
is zero growth.
Note that iii depends on the simplifying assumption we
made that r > 1. If r ≤ 1 − η, we are in the (possibly
more plausible) situation of low (g) but positive steady-state
growth.
IV. Comparative Dynamics
Here we consider four types of changes: improvements in
the access to capital, regional or market integration, increases
in technological complexity, and organizational innovations
that reduce coordination costs.
A. Institutional Improvements in the Access to
Entrepreneurship
We model this as a reduction in h necessary to run a busi-
ness, a change that increases the fraction of the population
that can afford to become entrepreneurs. This might come
from improvements in credit markets or, if h is interpreted as
a human capital acquisition cost, from education subsidies.
It even comes from loosening the kinds of legal restrictions,
common in many developing countries, that generally limit
business start-ups (typically these bind on the less wealthy).
For a formal treatment, it is helpful to give the economy
some chance of emerging from a subsistence steady state if
only h were low enough. So assume that subsistence generates
positive earnings sA, with s < w and that β is a random
variable, independent across generations and lineages and
independent of income or nerdiness. Specifically, β = β with
probability b, and β < β otherwise. Let β satisfy all of the
conditions in assumption 3. Notice that this modification to
the model does not change the values of r and rˆ.
In addition, assume that initially, we have h > βw, so that
the economy behaves just as it did before. In particular, the
subsistence steady state r = 0 always exists and is locally
stable, though now people are investing βs in their children.
Now let h fall to a point where βs > h > βs, and suppose
that r < b < rˆ. If we started at the subsistence steady state,
the effect of this decline in h is to increase the value of r
next period, from 0 to b. But this means we have (1 − η)b
entrepreneurs, who hire (1 − η)nb workers at wage w. Since
r < b, the innovation market begins to function (assuming the
nerds coordinate on the cogitation equilibrium). The children
of the entrepreneurs and inventors, as well as the children of
the generous (β) workers, will become entrepreneurs next
period.
Locally, the dynamics are now following the equation
rt+1 = (1−η)rt +p(σ)η+b(1−η)(1−rt), which converges
to a new steady state r∗∗ ≡ [(1 − η)b + ηp(σ)]/(η + b).
For plausible parameter values (η small), this exceeds r∗ but
remains in the factory equilibrium region (less than rˆ) if b is
small. Thus, as expected, increasing access to entrepreneur-
ship can pull the economy out of subsistence and onto the
path of industrialization and high steady-state growth.
But for other parameters (larger b), the economy may even-
tually leave the interval [r, rˆ], and the growth process slows
down. Similarly, further reductions in h may turn out to be
too much of a good thing: if βw > h, then all normals set
their children up in business, and innovation ceases or at best
declines.
Thus, improvements in institutions may have ambiguous
effects, depending on where the economy is to begin with. An
economy that has very poorly functioning credit markets or
costly education will generally be helped by improvements in
these institutions. But economies in which these institutions
are functioning moderately well may actually be hurt.
If one were to measure the rate of TFP growth across
economies with different qualities of institutions, one may
therefore find that growth rates are not monotonic in the
quality measure. Similarly, since the levels TFP will depend
on the history of their growth, neither should there be any
expectation of finding a monotonic pattern in a cross-country
regression of TFP levels on institutional quality.
B. Geographical Linkages and the Spread of Industrial
Revolution
A natural question to ask is whether integration of geo-
graphic regions might enhance the chances for a successful
take-off: if one region happens to enter the high-innovation
steady state, perhaps it can stimulate others to do the same.
For definiteness, assume that the hopeful case parameter con-
figuration discussed in the previous section prevails, and
suppose there are two equally populated regions, 1 and 2,
identical in all respects except for their wealth distributions.
One has an unequal distribution with r1 ∈ [r, rˆ], and the other
has a more equal distribution r2 > rˆ. Without linkages, region
1 is growing while region 2 is not.
A somewhat trivial answer to our question can be obtained
if we assume that innovations can diffuse (with a lag) across
regions, just as we have assumed for the baseline dynam-
ics in the previous section, but there are no factor flows (in
particular of nerds or normals) across borders. In this case,
invention continues to be confined to region 1, but region 2
benefits by implementing the new ideas in the ensuing periods
as they become publicly available. In steady state, consump-
tion grows at the same rate in both regions, but region 2 will
always be at a lower level, equal (at best) to the region 1
consumption of the previous period.
Of course, the assumption of complete and free diffu-
sion is somewhat facile, made here to maximize the chances
for sustained growth; indeed adopting existing technologies
is rarely easy (Acemoglu, Aghion, & Zilibotti, 2006); if
it were, there would be hardly be a problem of underde-
velopment! Indeed, one interpretation of micro-inventions
is that they partly involve adapting production processes
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or products to local conditions and markets. So let us ask
whether regional interaction will allow region 2 to become a
cradle of innovation once the process has started in region 1.
The simplest interesting case is complete integration of
the two regions, with nerds and normals free to move, so
there is effectively one large economy. There are two effects.
First, there is a redistribution of wealth (change in r): let the
wealth distribution r′ for the united region be the average
of the two distributions we began with: r′ = (r1 + r2)/2.
Second, because the size of the entrepreneurial population
has increased, the incentives to cogitate are strengthened.
Condition (6) now becomes
p(σ(r))2r(1 − η)q(r, p(σ(r))2η) ≥ θA, (7)
because the population has doubled. Since q(r, m) =
Aπ(w(r))[(1 + γ)m − 1]/m, the left-hand side of equation
(7) increases, given r. It follows that r decreases, so that the
basin of attraction for innovation increases in size. (A similar
calculation shows that r decreases as well, so that the basin
of attraction for moderate growth may also increase.) The
recursion equations in lemma 2 are otherwise unchanged.
The increase in the basin of attraction would seem to be
good news for the spread of the Industrial Revolution. (To be
sure, it is predicated on the complementarities among inven-
tions and the lack of any possibility of duplication despite
the greater population of nerds; if duplication were possible,
incentives to innovate would be weakened somewhat, and the
effects on the basin of attraction for high growth would be
less clear.) However, whether the new integrated region will
continue to grow depends on how the change in dynamics
interacts with the change in initial conditions brought about
by mixing the wealth distributions. Indeed, in the case we
have been considering, in which r′ is between r1 and r2, inte-
gration will lead to convergence to the high-growth steady
state only if r′ < rˆ. If instead r′ > rˆ, then the integrated econ-
omy converges to the prosperous stagnation steady state, and
the Industrial Revolution ends. Of course, other cases are pos-
sible. A growing region could integrate with a very unequal
(low r) region, leading to either overall growth or stagna-
tion. Or an unequal region and a prosperously stagnant one
could integrate, and the Industrial Revolution could take off.
On balance, the distributional effects of regional integration
make the process of take-off only slightly less difficult.17
C. Technological Complexity and Modern Developing
Economies
To what extent can Smithian growth facilitate development
in the modern world? On the one hand, a poor (low r) coun-
try’s entrepreneurs may have a higher willingness to pay as
soon as they are able to sell on a world market, and this may
17 An intermediate case of integration is to restrict mobility across regions
to the nerds. This introduces a more subtle analysis that is beyond the scope
of this paper; the bottom line is that there is a tendency for innovation to
increase relative to the no-mobility case but to be confined to only one
region.
incentivize the local nerds, allowing an expanded basin of
attraction similar to the case discussed above.
On the other hand, the relevant technological frontier may
be further away (Acemoglu et al., 2006). One way to model
this is to think in terms of the level of complexity, repre-
sented by the task-to-population ratio; call it χ (thus far,
it has been assumed equal to 1). The production technol-
ogy becomes exp(
∫ χ
0 log[at( j)lt( j)]dj). The growth rate is
now (1 + γ)ηp/χ , and the threshold value r of educated
that sustains growth is θ/{(1 − η)[(1 + γ)ηp/χ − 1]π(w)}.
With simple technologies (χ small), growth rates sustained
by the Smithian mechanism are high, and the economy is
more likely be able to sustain growth because r is small and
rˆ is unchanged.18 An exogenous increase in the complex-
ity of technology will lower growth rates and increase the
likelihood that technological progress comes to a halt.
If one interprets complexity as originating in a world
technological frontier, one that may be expanding through
internalized R&D, an implication of this observation is that
Smithian growth may be a particularly inadequate mech-
anism by which a developing country might catch up to
the rest of the world. Although an increase in χ instanta-
neously increases output (assuming the a( j) of the “new”
steps are equal on average to the rest), over the longer run,
this benefit would be overshadowed by the slowdown in
growth, and a Smithian country will fall further and further
behind the R&D-driven frontier. Possibly more than their
more developed counterparts, such countries may have to
rely on non-Smithian mechanisms (state subsidies or private
sector internalized R&D, both of which became more or less
common in the rich countries in the latter half of the twentieth
century) to achieve innovation and growth.
D. Organizational Innovation: Revisiting the Role of the
Factory in the Industrial Revolution
As suggested earlier, a decrease in the coordination cost c
can be identified with the introduction of the manufactory and
subsequently the early factories. When c falls, the division
of labor becomes less costly for entrepreneurs. Moreover, w
decreases, σ increases, and therefore r falls while r∗ rises.
Hence, the basin of attraction of the high-growth steady state
is enlarged, firms have a larger division of labor there, and the
growth rate increases. There is also more income inequality
in the functional distribution of income and a likely increase
in inequality in the size distribution (since r∗ < rˆ, increasing
the fraction of rich slightly raises most inequality measures).
Observe that for r > rˆ, since w increases, σ falls. There-
fore, the rate of growth decreases in this region. Hence, in
our model, organizational innovations leading to a decrease
in the cost of coordination tend to intensify the dependence
18 It may be reasonable to suppose that increased complexity would
increase the coordination cost for a given choice of σ, since there are now
more tasks to coordinate. For instance, the coordination parameter cost
might be written as cχ. All else the same, the division of labor would be
reduced with increased complexity and the effects on growth exacerbated.
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of growth on inequality. Once the manufactory comes into
being, changes in inequality would lead to larger changes
in growth rates than they would have under the putting-out
system.
Our model suggests that the significant role played by the
factory and the introduction of the division of labor has to do
with the concomitant increase in labor division that would
have facilitated invention rather than any static increase in
surplus that factory production might have generated. Indeed,
in our model, the factory (σ large) actually generates less sur-
plus than does artisanal production. Some historians (e.g.,
Clark, 1994; Cohen, 1981) have argued similarly that in
the early years of the Industrial Revolution, the factory was
perhaps more profitable but not more productive than the
putting-out system it replaced.
V. Conclusion
We have explored a causal link between the organization
of firms and technical progress. In contrast to such links that
have been explored so far in organizational growth theory, the
mechanism we study involves an externality in the benefits of
invention rather than on firms’ internalization of those ben-
efits, and is arguably especially pertinent to understanding
early episodes of growth such as the Industrial Revolution.
Starting from the Smithian idea that there is an increased
likelihood of innovations in the production process when
labor is more specialized, we show that entrepreneurs may be
induced to choose innovation-enhancing organizations even
though intractable contractual incompleteness and incentive
problems prevent them from appropriating the returns to
innovations. The conditions that do this in a laissez-faire mar-
ket equilibrium depend on a constellation of factors: a free
enterprise legal environment that allows an individual with an
idea to sell it to a sufficiently large fraction of the market, an
imperfect credit market that restricts entry into entrepreneur-
ship, a distribution of wealth that is neither too equal nor
too unequal, and the need of a coordination device among
inventors.
An economy that generates technological progress initially
may eventually violate the distributional condition or may, for
reasons having to do with improvements in credit markets,
subsidized education, or other redistributions, switch to a no-
progress equilibrium, with firms that are too unspecialized to
foster further Smithian innovation: trickle-down effects may
eventually limit growth.
The chart in figure 3 plots average growth rates of per
capita GDP against inequality for several European coun-
tries for the period 1820 to 1870. Growth rates are from
Maddison (2001), and inequality is measured as the ratio of
skilled to unskilled wages, taken from Allen (2001).19 The
19 Since Allen’s wage data are for Milan, “Italy” is actually Lombardy
1836–1857, with the growth taken from Pichler (2001) and calibrated to
Maddison’s other estimates using the two authors’ estimates for Austria
(Maddison’s estimate for all of Italy is somewhat lower than our imputed
estimate for Lombardy; this has little effect on the basic pattern).
Figure 3.—Inequality versus Growth
inverted-U pattern is clearly displayed, with growth rates for
the lowest-skill premium countries (Netherlands and France)
slightly higher than those for the highest-skill premium coun-
try (Spain). The contrast between the Netherlands, for which
the wage data are from (Protestant) Amsterdam, and Belgium,
for which wages are from (Catholic) Antwerp, is also strik-
ing. Obviously evidence of this sort is at best indicative (e.g.,
institutions are not identical across countries, and we would
rather have TFP growth data than GDP growth), but it does
accord broadly with the basic predictions of our model.20
Furthermore, the model has other implications for growth
theory more generally besides the link it draws between
inequality and technological progress. First, “institutional”
improvements, such as the increased efficiency of credit
markets, need not have monotonic effects on the rate of
technological progress. Thus, starting from very poorly func-
tioning markets, both static and dynamic efficiency are likely
to improve as output increases and the demand for inven-
tions increases enough to activate the innovation market. But
further improvements to these institutions will eventually
reduce the division of labor and therefore the rate of technical
progress and economic growth. An economy with moderately
well-functioning credit markets that has been rapidly grow-
ing will have higher productivity than one with perfect credit
markets that has been growing slowly or not at all. It follows
that total factor productivity need not be monotonic in the
quality of institutions, either over time or in cross-section.21
Second, taking the (manu)factory to be the organizational
innovation that reduced the cost of labor division, then
one interpretation is that organizational improvements may
20 So does other historical scholarship on the Industrial Revolution in
Britain (Crafts & Harley, 2004; O’Brien, 1986). This research emphasizes
the peculiar roles of the enclosure movement in creating a large population
of landless poor to supply the labor markets and in helping to generate
a relatively large upper-middle class and concomitantly large market for
manufactured goods. Lacking these elements, other European countries
were slower to industrialize.
21 The model thereby also offers a mechanism for reversal-of-fortune phe-
nomena that have been documented in historical cross-country comparisons
of economic prosperity (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2002).
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indeed have helped to lead the economy from a path of sub-
sistence to one of sustained growth, not so much by reducing
the cost of entry into entrepreneurship but, more important,
by raising the equilibrium level of specialization, thereby
facilitating invention. This seems to support the institutional
view of the importance of the factory system in the industrial
revolution, albeit perhaps not in the manner Cohen (1981),
Millward (1981), and North (1981) argued.
Finally, it is worth remarking on the implications of the
model in case of coordination failure among the inventors. For
the high-wage share regime, it makes only a small difference.
If there was a switch to the no-invention equilibrium, the
fraction of rich would fall, as would the growth rate, albeit
not by much since it was low to begin with: the new steady
state would be r = 1 − η instead of r = 1 − η + ηp(σ). On
the other hand, the same switch from cogitation to vegetating
equilibrium in the low-wage share regime would be more
dramatic. An economy in the basin of attraction of the high-
growth steady state now follows the dismal dynamics rt+1 =
(1−η)rt . In short order, the economy would be carried below
rC , outside the basin of attraction of high growth and outside
the region where the cogitation equilibrium exists.
This analysis offers a specific interpretation to the view,
expressed by some historians and economists (Crafts, 1985;
Acemoglu & Zilibotti, 1997), that the Industrial Revolution
occurred because of “luck.” Many factors, partly institu-
tional, partly technological, and partly distributional, must
fall into place in order for a period of sustained technological
growth to emerge. As our model suggests, the path to sus-
tained prosperity is a narrow one, difficult to find, and easily
lost.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The Symmetric Case
We establish the lemma in a finite economy, that is when
there are finitely many inventors and agents. The continuum
economy can be approximated by arbitrarily large such finite
economies, and we restrict attention to equilibria of the con-
tinuum economy that are the limits of equilibria with finite
economies.
There are m inventions available. We consider symmetric
price equilibria, that is, when all inventors post the same price
q in equilibrium.
Case 1: Excess Supply for Labor. When there is excess
demand for labor (r < rˆ), entrepreneurs are not constrained
since the outside option of workers is u∗ = 0, and they will
offer a wage wA(k) independent of the technology they have
adopted. On the innovation market, faced with prices q for
each innovation they solve,
max
k
π(w)A(k) − kq.
Because A(k) is convex increasing,22 it is immediate that con-
ditional on adopting, entrepreneurs will choose k = m, and
their payoff from adopting is then π(w)A(m)−mq. They will
adopt only if π(w)A(m) − mq ≥ π(w)A(0). If the inequal-
ity is strict, one of the inventors could deviate to a higher
price and increase his profit. Clearly there is no incentive
22 Convexity of A(k) is immediate since the second derivative is (log(1 +
γ))2A(k) > 0.
for an inventor to decrease his price since he would face the
same demand for his invention. Hence the unique symmetric
equilibrium is
q = π(w)A(m) − A(0)
m
,
and all the surplus from innovations goes to the inventors.
Case 2: Excess Demand of Labor. Since r > rˆ, in the
labor market equilibrium, a measure rˆ of entrepreneurs hire
workers and a measure r−rˆ work alone. For the entrepreneurs
working alone, their profit from adopting h innovations is
αA(k) − kq; hence the previous case implies that they will
adopt either all innovations or none. They will adopt if and
only if
q ≤ αA(m) − A(0)
m
. (A1)
For any u∗, the wage chosen by an entrepreneur with
technology A(k) who hires n workers is max{w, u∗/A(k)}.23
Let
Π(k, u∗) = π (max{w, u∗/A(k)}) .
The value of being an entrepreneur is therefore
V(k, u∗) = max[α, Π(k, u∗)]A(k).
Lemma 3: For any u∗, V(k, u∗) is a strictly increasing and
convex function of k.
Proof. SinceΠ(k, u∗) increases and converges toπ(w) > 1,
there exist cutoff values k0(u∗), k1(u∗), k0(u∗) < k1(u∗) such
that
V(k, u∗) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
αA(k) if k ≤ k0(u∗)
π(u∗/A(k))A(k) if k ∈ [k0(u∗), k1(u∗)]
π(w)A(k) if k ≥ k1(u∗)
.
It is enough to show that π(u∗/A(k))A(k) is convex in
order to show that V(k, u∗) is convex. Differentiating twice,
we have
d2π(u∗/A(k))A(k)
dk2
= n(log(1 + γ))2
(
1 − 4cμ
u∗
A(k)
)
A(k)
≥ n(log(1 + γ))2
(
1 − 4cμ
w
)
A(k)
= n(log(1 + γ))2 (1 − 4√cμ)A(k)
≥ 0,
23 Recall that for a given technology, w is the profit-maximizing normal-
ized wage. Hence, if u∗/A(k) < w, it is best for the entrepreneur to offer
the wage w, that is, give a surplus to his workers strictly greater than u∗.
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where the second inequality is due to u∗/A(k) ≥ w and the
last inequality by assumption 2.
If condition (A1) holds, entrepreneurs who work alone
have technology A(m); since they can hire workers if they
desire, it must be the case that V(m, u∗) = αA(m), that is,
that u∗ = wA(m).
If condition (A1) does not hold, inventors sell only to
entrepreneurs who hire workers. By lemma 3, we can apply
the reasoning in the case of excess supply of labor and the
unique symmetric equilibrium must satisfy
q = V(m, u
∗) − V(0, u∗)
m
, (A2)
and entrepreneurs get V(0, u∗). Since entrepreneurs who
work alone have a profit of αA(0), we must have V(0, u∗) =
αA(0), and therefore u∗ = wA(0). Note that entrepreneurs
who adopt the m innovations can hire workers at a wage
wˆ = wA(0)/A(m).
At prices q, entrepreneurs are indifferent between working
alone and using technology A(0) or hiring workers and using
technology A(m). The return to an inventor is αrq. If an inven-
tor sets a price of q′ < q, then V(m, u∗)−(m−1)q−q′ > A(0)
and all entrepreneurs who work alone should purchase the
m inventions and hire workers. This is clearly inconsistent
with an equilibrium, therefore, it must be the case that con-
dition (A1) holds. But then it must hold with an equality by
condition (A2).
